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Abstract
In a threshold broadcast encryption scheme, a sender chooses (ad-hoc) a set of n receivers and a threshold
t, and then encrypts a message by using the public keys of all the receivers, in such a way that the original
plaintext can be recovered only if at least t receivers cooperate.
This kind of scheme has many applications in mobile ad-hoc networks, characterized by their lack of in-
frastructure as well as for the high dynamism of their nodes. Threshold broadcast encryption schemes are
much more appropriate for mobile ad-hoc scenarios than standard threshold public key encryption schemes,
where the set of receivers and the threshold for decryption must be known in advance (and remain the same
for the rest of the protocol).
Previously proposed threshold broadcast encryption schemes have ciphertexts which contain at least n
group elements. In this paper, we propose a new scheme where the ciphertexts contain essentially n − t
group elements. The construction uses secret sharing techniques and the ElGamal public key cryptosystem
as basic tools. We formally prove the security of the scheme, by reduction to the security of ElGamal
cryptosystem.
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1 Introduction
In a threshold public key encryption scheme a message is encrypted and sent to a
group of receivers, in such a way that the cooperation of at least t of them (where t
is the threshold) is necessary in order to recover the original message. Such schemes
have many applications in situations where one wants to avoid that a single party
has all the power/responsibility to protect or obtain some critical information. The
usual strategy to implement this idea is the following: the set of receivers, which is
set from the beginning, runs an interactive setup protocol which takes as input a
threshold (chosen by themselves) and outputs a public key for the set and shares of
the matching secret key.
The fact that the set of receivers and the threshold are decided from the begin-
ning can limit the applications of these schemes in real life. One can imagine that
the sender of the message, who wants to protect some information, may want to
decide who will be the designated receivers in an ad-hoc way, just before encrypting
the message, and also decide the threshold of receivers which will be necessary to
recover the information. With this motivation in mind, a scheme for this situation
would have the following properties:
1. There is no setup phase or ﬁxed groups. Each potential receiver has his own
pair of secret/public keys.
2. The sender chooses (ad-hoc) the set of receivers P and the threshold t for
the decryption. Then he encrypts the message by using the public keys of all the
players in P.
3. A ciphertext corresponding to the pair (P, t) can only be decrypted if at least t
members of P cooperate by using their secret keys. Otherwise, it is computationally
infeasible to obtain any information about the plaintext.
1.1 Application to Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
This kind of schemes are specially useful in order to guarantee security in mobile
ad-hoc networks. A mobile ad-hoc network (also known as MANET) is created
on the ﬂy. It consists of a set of self-organized and mobile nodes (e.g. PDAs,
laptops or cellular phones) without any ﬁxed infrastructure. The topology of a
MANET changes rapidly and unpredictably over time. Such dynamism can be due
to new nodes joining the network, whereas at the same time others leave it or just
fail because they move to a region that is not in the cover range of the network.
Standard threshold public key encryption schemes - where threshold and set of
receivers are decided at the setup stage- are not always an ideal solution for this
very general scenario. Imagine for example that a sender wants to send a message
to a group of receivers in a mobile ad-hoc network, where a considerable number of
these receivers are newcomers, that is, they have just entered into the network. To
use standard threshold encryption techniques, a public key for the set of receivers
and a threshold for decryption must have been set up in a protocol which is either
interactive among the receivers, or executed by an external entity; both situations
are typically not desirable in ad-hoc networks. Each time someone wants to encrypt
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a message with a diﬀerent set of receivers or a diﬀerent threshold, which is likely
to happen quite often in a MANET, the interactive setup protocol should be run
again. This does not ﬁt in with the computational and energy constraints of an
ad-hoc network.
We emphasize that, unlike in threshold public key encryption schemes, in a
threshold broadcast encryption scheme the sender can decide the set of receivers in
an ad-hoc way, for example depending on the set of nodes he is directly connected
with. Not only this, he can also decide the threshold of receivers which will be
necessary to recover the information, for example depending on the secrecy level of
the speciﬁc message he wants to send.
1.2 Related work
Note that, when t = 1, the resulting scheme will be a broadcast encryption scheme
[10], where a sender encrypts a message in such a way that any member of the
set of receivers can decrypt it. For this reason, we have decided to use the name
threshold broadcast encryption scheme (TBE scheme, for short) to refer to this
kind of schemes. Other possible names could be dynamic threshold encryption (as
used in [11]) or ad-hoc threshold encryption. To the best of our knowledge, only
two works have dealt with this extension of the concept of broadcast encryption.
In [11] the authors propose a scheme based on RSA; even if the authors claim that
the length of the ciphertexts is constant, the ciphertext contains an integer modulo
N , where N is the product of all the RSA moduli of the receivers. Therefore, the
actual length of the ciphertext is at least n times the length of a standard RSA
modulus, where n is the number of receivers. In [7], the authors propose a TBE
scheme for identity-based scenarios; again, the ciphertexts contain at least n group
elements.
1.3 Our contribution
In this paper we propose a new threshold broadcast encryption scheme where the
length of the ciphertexts is essentially n − t, being n the number of receivers and
t the threshold for the decryption. The idea is to use some techniques related to
secret sharing and combine them with some suitable public key encryption scheme.
In this work we use ElGamal encryption scheme [9]. We formally prove that the
proposed TBE scheme has the same security level as ElGamal cryptosystem.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some tools
(secret sharing, public key encryption) that will be necessary for the construction
of our scheme. In Section 3 we give the general deﬁnitions of the protocols of a
threshold broadcast encryption scheme, along with the description of the formal
security model for such schemes. We propose our scheme in Section 4, and we
prove that the scheme is secure, by reduction to the security of ElGamal encryption
scheme. We conclude our work in Section 5.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
The idea of secret sharing schemes was independently introduced by Shamir [12]
and Blakley [5]. A (d,N)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a method by means
of which a special ﬁgure, called usually dealer, distributes a secret s among a set
P = {P1, . . . , PN} of N players. Each player Pi privately receives from the dealer a
piece of information si (or share). Then, those subsets with at least d players can
recover the secret s from their shares, while subsets containing less than d players
do not obtain any information at all about the secret.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [12] solves this problem by means of polynomial
interpolation. Let GF (q) be a ﬁnite ﬁeld with q > N elements, and let s ∈ GF (q)
be the secret to be shared. The dealer picks a polynomial f(x) of degree at most
d− 1, where the constant term of f(x) is s and all other coeﬃcients aj are selected
from GF (q), uniformly and independently, at random. That is, f(x) has the form
f(x) = s +
∑d−1
j=1 ajx
j .
Every player Pi is publicly and uniquely associated to a ﬁeld element αi. The
dealer privately sends to player Pi his share si = f(αi), for i = 1, . . . , N .
Now, players in a set A ⊂ P such that |A| ≥ d can recover the secret s = f(0),
by using Lagrange interpolation. Actually, players in A can compute the value of
the polynomial f(x) evaluated on any point αj, with the formula:
f(αj) =
∑
Pi∈A
λAijf(αi) =
∑
Pi∈A
λAijsi,
where
λAij =
∏
P∈A, =i
αj − α
αi − α
.
On the other hand, it can be proved that players in a subset B ⊂ P such that
|B| < d do not obtain any information about the polynomial f(x), apart from their
shares {f(αk)}Pk∈B , of course.
2.2 Standard Public Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme PKE= (PKE.KG,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) consists of
three algorithms:
• The probabilistic key generation algorithm PKE.KG takes as input a security
parameter k and returns a pair (pk, sk) consisting of a public key pk and a
matching secret key sk; we denote an execution of this protocol as (pk, sk) ←
PKE.KG(1k).
• The probabilistic encryption algorithm PKE.Enc takes as input a public key pk
and a message m, and returns a ciphertext C; we write C ← PKE.Enc(pk,m).
• The deterministic decryption algorithm PKE.Dec takes the secret key sk and a
ciphertext C as input, and outputs either the corresponding message or a special
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symbol ⊥. We write m˜ ← PKE.Dec(sk,C).
We recall the standard notion of security for public key encryption schemes
in terms of indistinguishability. We consider both chosen-plaintext and chosen-
ciphertext attacks. For this, we consider the following game that an attacker Aatk
plays against a challenger:
(pk, sk) ← PKE.KG(1k)
(St,m0,m1) ← A
O1(·)
atk (ﬁnd, pk)
b ← {0, 1} at random; C∗ ← PKE.Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← A
O2(·)
atk (guess, C
∗, St).
In both phases (ﬁnd and guess) of the attack, the attacker Aatk can have access
to a decryption oracle with respect to sk for ciphertexts of his choice, depending on
the considered kind of attacks. Namely, if atk is a chosen plaintext attack (CPA),
then there is no access at all, which we write as O1 = O2 = . If atk is a partial
chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1), then O1 = PKE.Dec(sk, ·) and O2 = . Finally,
if atk is a full chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2), then O1 = O2 = PKE.Dec(sk, ·).
In this last case, ACCA2 is not allowed to query the oracle O2 with the challenge
ciphertext C∗. The advantage of such an adversary Aatk is deﬁned as
Adv(Aatk) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
A public key encryption scheme is said to be ε-indistinguishable under atk at-
tacks if Adv(Aatk) < ε for any attacker Aatk which runs in polynomial time.
2.3 ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme
ElGamal public key encryption scheme, EG PKE= (EG PKE.KG, EG PKE.Enc,
EG PKE.Dec), works as follows (see [9] for the original proposal):
• EG PKE.KG takes as input a security parameter k and generates two prime
numbers p and q such that q is k bit long and q|p − 1. Then a cyclic subgroup
G = 〈g〉 of Zp is chosen, with order q. All these values are made public. The
secret key sk of the user is chosen at random in Z∗q, whereas the matching public
key is pk = gsk mod p.
• EG PKE.Enc takes as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ G; then a random
value a ∈ Z∗q is chosen, and the ciphertext C = (r, s) is computed as r = g
a mod p
and s = m · pka mod p.
• EG PKE.Dec takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext C = (r, s), and outputs
s/rsk mod p = m.
ElGamal cryptosystem is known to be indistinguishable under CPA attacks,
assuming the hardness of the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) problem. It is also
known that this scheme is not indistinguishable under CCA2 attacks, because of
its homomorphic properties. Nothing has been proved about indistinguishability of
ElGamal encryption scheme under CCA1 attacks.
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3 Threshold Broadcast Encryption
Roughly speaking, the operations of a threshold broadcast encryption scheme work
as follows: the sender chooses a set of receivers and a threshold t, and then encrypts a
message by using the public keys of these receivers. Given the resulting ciphertext,
the original message can be recovered by any set of at least t of the designated
receivers: they use their secret keys to compute partial decryptions which are then
combined to obtain the message.
More formally, a threshold broadcast encryption scheme TBE= (TBE.Setup,
TBE.KG,TBE.Enc,TBE.PartDec,TBE.Dec) consists of ﬁve algorithms:
• The randomized setup algorithm TBE.Setup takes as input a security parameter
k and outputs some public parameters params, which will be common to all the
users of the system. We write params← TBE.Setup(1k).
• The randomized key generation algorithm TBE.KG takes as input some public
parameters params and returns a pair (pk, sk) consisting of a public key and
a matching secret key; we denote an execution of this protocol as (pk, sk) ←
TBE.KG(params).
• The randomized encryption algorithm TBE.Enc takes as input a set of public
keys {pki}Pi∈P corresponding to a set P of n players, a threshold t satisfying
1 ≤ t ≤ n, and a message m. The output is a ciphertext C, which contains the
description of P and t; we write C ← TBE.Enc(P, {pki}Pi∈P , t,m).
• The (possibly randomized) partial decryption algorithm TBE.PartDec takes as
input a ciphertext C for the pair (P, t) and a secret key ski of a player Pi ∈ P.
The output is a partial decryption value m˜i or a special symbol ⊥. We denote
with m˜i ← TBE.PartDec(C, ski) an execution of this protocol.
• The deterministic ﬁnal decryption algorithm TBE.Dec takes as input a ciphertext
C for the pair (P, t) and t partial decryptions {m˜i}Pi∈A corresponding to players
in some subset A ⊂ P. The output is a message m or a special symbol ⊥. We
write m˜ ← TBE.Dec(C, {m˜i}Pi∈A, A).
An important parameter of such schemes is the length of the ciphertext C. When
measuring this length (in our proposal, but also in previous proposals), we do not
consider the description of the set P: in some cases, the description can consist of
the list of all the public keys, which already has length n. In some other cases, the
description can be much simpler, for example if the set of receivers is formed by
the workers of a company. For the previous TBE schemes in the literature [11,7],
the ciphertexts contain at least n group elements, for some mathematical group
(usually large). In this paper we will propose a new scheme where the ciphertexts
contain essentially n− t group elements.
3.1 Security of Threshold Broadcast Encryption Schemes
When formalizing security of standard public key encryption schemes, one usually
considers a single challenged public key, as in the deﬁnition we provide in Section
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2.2. This is because it has been shown [1] that security in this model is equivalent
to security in a model which considers many public keys.
In threshold broadcast encryption schemes, however, we must consider many
public keys when we formalize security, because each encryption and decryption
in the system involve many public/secret keys. An attacker can corrupt diﬀerent
users, in two possible ways: registering new public keys for such users, or obtaining
the secret key matching with the public key of some previously honest users. The
ﬁnal goal of the attacker is to obtain any information about a message which has
been encrypted for a pair (P∗, t∗) such that the number of corrupted players in P∗
is less than t∗.
One remark to be done is how to deal with the ﬁrst kind of corruptions, those
where the attacker registers new public keys. In the real world, certiﬁcation author-
ities (should) require users to prove the knowledge of the secret key which matches
with the public key they are registering. This can be done by means of a Proof
of Knowledge [3]. In the game which models the security of threshold broadcast
encryption schemes, the attacker will be required to perform such a Proof of Knowl-
edge of the secret keys which match with the new public keys he wants to register.
Because of the ‘proof of knowledge’ property of the employed Proof of Knowledge
system [3], this is equivalent to require the adversary to supply also the matching
secret key, each time he registers a public key. This approach has already been
followed in other works [2,4].
For simplicity, when analyzing our scheme we will consider only the ﬁrst kind
of corruption. If both kinds of corruption are considered, the scheme can be still
be proved secure, but the proof becomes a bit more confusing. Taking all this
into consideration, indistinguishability for threshold broadcast encryption schemes
is deﬁned by considering the following game that an attacker Batk plays against a
challenger:
params← TBE.Setup(1k)
For players Pi ∈ U1, run (pki, ski) ← TBE.KG(params)
Batk can register public keys at any time: for players Pj ∈ U2, he runs
(pkj , skj) ← TBE.KG(params) and broadcasts (Pj , pkj , skj)
(St,P∗, t∗,m0,m1) ← B
O1(·)
atk (ﬁnd, params, {pki}Pi∈U1)
b ← {0, 1} at random; C∗ ← TBE.Enc(P∗, {pki}Pi∈P∗ , t
∗,mb)
b′ ← B
O2(·)
atk (guess, C
∗, St).
Of course, in order to consider meaningful and successful such an attack, we
require |P∗ ∩ U2| < t
∗. Otherwise, Batk knows the secret key of at least t
∗ players
in P∗ and can decrypt C∗ by himself, obtaining mb.
Depending on the considered kind of attacks, Batk can also have access to a
decryption oracle for tuples (P, t, C) of his choice. As answer, Batk receives all
the information that would be broadcast in a complete decryption process for this
tuple; this includes all the partial decryption values. If atk is a chosen plaintext
attack (CPA), then there is no access at all, i.e. O1 = O2 = . If atk is a partial
chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1), then O1 = TBE.PartDec(·) ∪ TBE.Dec(·) and
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O2 = . Finally, if atk is a full chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2), then O1 = O2 =
TBE.PartDec(·) ∪TBE.Dec(·). In this last case, BCCA2 is not allowed to query the
oracle O2 with the challenge tuple (P
∗, t∗, C∗).
The advantage of such an adversary Batk is deﬁned as
Adv(Batk) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
A threshold broadcast encryption scheme is said to be ε-indistinguishable under
atk attacks if Adv(Batk) < ε for any attacker Batk which runs in polynomial time.
4 A Threshold Broadcast Encryption Scheme with
|C| ≈ n− t
Our threshold broadcast encryption scheme is based on ElGamal. We denote
it as EG TBE = (EG TBE.Setup,EG TBE.KG,EG TBE.Enc,EG TBE.PartDec,
EG TBE.Dec), where the ﬁve algorithms work as follows.
EG TBE.Setup. Given a security parameter k, it generates two prime numbers
p and q such that q is k bits long and q|p − 1. Then a cyclic subgroup G = 〈g〉
of Zp is chosen, with order q. We will use a collision-resistant hash function h :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q which assigns one diﬀerent element in Z
∗
q to each potential player, to
apply Shamir’s secret sharing techniques. Therefore, the output of the protocol is
params = (p, q,G, g, h).
EG TBE.KG. Each player Pi chooses at random his secret key ski ∈ Z
∗
q.
The matching public key is pki = g
ski mod p. (From now on in the paper, we
will sometimes omit the explicit mod p, since all the operations will be performed
modulo p.)
EG TBE.Enc. In this phase of the scheme, a sender wants to encrypt a message
addressed to some set of receivers that he chooses ad-hoc, in such a way that the
message can be recovered only if the number of receivers that cooperate to decrypt
is equal to or greater than a certain threshold that is also chosen by the sender.
In order to encrypt a message m ∈ G addressed to some set P = {P1, . . . , Pn}
of n players, with threshold t ≤ n for the decryption, the idea is to set up an
(n,N)-threshold secret sharing scheme, where N = 2n− t. Let λPi0 be the Lagrange
coeﬃcients deﬁned in Section 2.1, useful to compute the value of the polynomial in
the point α0 = 0 from the value of the polynomial in the points {αi}Pi∈P , where
αi = h(Pi). The sender must act as follows.
(i) Compute PK =
∏
Pi∈P
pk
λPi0
i mod p.
(ii) Choose a set P˜ of n − t (dummy) players, such that P˜ ∩ P = ∅. For each
Pj ∈ P˜ , compute αj = h(Pj) and then deﬁne pkj =
∏
Pi∈P
pk
λPij
i mod p.
(iii) Choose at random a ∈ Z∗q and compute r = g
a mod p.
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(iv) Compute s = m · PKa mod p.
(v) For each Pj ∈ P˜ , compute m˜j = pk
a
j mod p.
(vi) Deﬁne the ciphertext as C = (P, t, P˜ , r, s, {m˜j}Pj∈P˜).
Note that the sender has used ElGamal encryption scheme with a public key
PK such that the corresponding secret key SK = logg PK is not known by any
single player. On the other hand, any subset of n players in P ∪ P˜ could recover
SK from their own secret keys ski, by using Lagrange interpolation, if we implicitly
deﬁne skj = logg pkj , for all Pj ∈ P˜ . In the particular case of threshold decryption,
since the ciphertext C already includes n− t partial decryptions, only t new partial
decryptions, coming from P, will be necessary to recover the plaintext. Note also
that a ciphertext C, excluding the description of the sets P and P˜ , contains n−t+2
group elemtents (in Zp). The description of the set P˜ can be actually very short; for
example, the sender can look for an interval of n− t integers J = {j0, j0+1, . . . , j0+
n− t− 1} (modulo q) such that αi /∈ J for all Pi ∈ P, and deﬁne the set P˜ simply
as the n− t dummy users Pj verifying αj ∈ J . Note that in this case, the value j0 is
enough to describe the set P˜ . The resulting ciphertexts are then shorter than those
in all the previously proposed schemes, for any value of t satisfying 2 ≤ t ≤ n.
EG TBE.PartDec. Given a ciphertext C = (P, t, P˜ , r, s, {m˜j}Pj∈P˜ ), any
player Pi ∈ P can compute his partial decryption m˜i = r
ski mod p.
It would be possible to add robustness techniques in order to detect invalid
partial decryptions. For example, each player Pi can be required to add to his
partial decryption a zero-knowledge proof that DiscLogr(m˜i) = DiscLogg(pki). This
robust variant of our scheme, that we do not consider for the sake of simplicity, can
also be proved secure.
EG TBE.Dec. Given a ciphertext C = (P, t, P˜ , r, s, {m˜j}Pj∈P˜ ) and a set of t
partial decryptions m˜i, corresponding to a subset A ⊂ P with |A| = t, a combiner
algorithm considers the whole set of partial decryptions, from B = A∪ P˜ , and then
computes
κ =
∏
Pi∈B
m˜
λBi0
i mod p = g
a
P
Pi∈B
λBi0ski
=
= gaSK = PKa.
Then the plaintext m is recovered by computing m = s/κmod p.
4.1 Eﬃciency of the Scheme
To encrypt a message for a subset P of n receivers, with threshold t for decryption,
the sender must perform n + n(n − t + 1) + 1 modular exponentiations. However,
there are only n bases for these exponentiations (i.e. the values pki, for Pi ∈ P)
and so pre-computation techniques can be used to speed up the ﬁnal computation
time of this phase.
For the partial decryption of a ciphertext, any of the t receivers involved in the
decryption must locally compute a modular exponentiation. Finally, the combiner
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algorithm must perform n modular exponentiations to recover the plaintext from
the ciphertext and the partial decryptions.
4.2 Our Scheme is as Secure as ElGamal Cryptosystem
In this section we prove that our threshold broadcast encryption scheme is essentially
as secure as ElGamal public key encryption scheme. As it happens with ElGamal,
our scheme is not secure under CCA2 attacks. With respect to CPA and CCA1
attacks, we are going to show that a successful attack against our scheme implies a
successful attack against ElGamal.
As we remarked in Section 3.1, we consider for simplicity only the ﬁrst kind of
corruption, and not the corruptions where the attacker asks for the secret key of
a previously registered public key. If this second type of corruption is considered,
the proof is still possible (with a slightly worse reduction factor) but becomes more
cumbersome: the public keys of the users are deﬁned in two diﬀerent ways, depend-
ing on a probability distribution. For one of the ways, the matching secret key is
known and so the corruption queries can be correctly answered for these users. For
the other way, the secret key is not known, but a hypothetical attack involving this
public key can be transformed into an attack against ElGamal cryptosystem.
Theorem 4.1 For atk =CPA,CCA1, if there exists an attacker Batk against our
threshold broadcast encryption scheme with Adv(Batk) ≥ ε, then there exists an
attacker Aatk against ElGamal public key encryption scheme with Adv(Aatk) ≥ ε/4.
Proof. We are going to deal with the CCA1 case, obviously the CPA case can be
proved in a similar (but simpler) way. Let us assume therefore the existence of a
CCA1 attacker B against our TBE scheme, and let us construct a CCA1 attacker A
against ElGamal. A receives an ElGamal public key (p, q,G, g, y) as initial input.
Now A prepares the initialization of the hypothetical attacker B. Namely, for
each player Pi ∈ U1, A chooses at random βi ∈ Z
∗
q and computes pki = y
βi mod p.
Finally, A chooses a collision-resistant hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q. The public
parameters for B will be params = (p, q,G, g, h). The attacker A initializes the
attack B by sending him (params, {pki}Pi∈P).
B can register new public keys, for players Pj ∈ U2: he must broadcast the
resulting pairs (pkj , skj). Now B can make decryption queries, for ciphertexts C =
(P, t, P˜ , r, s, {m˜j}Pj∈P˜), where P, P˜ ⊂ U1 ∪ U2. The attacker A has to simulate
the information that B would obtain in the whole decryption procedure for this
ciphertext (including all the partial decryption values m˜i for Pi ∈ P). To do this,
remember that A has access to his own ElGamal decryption oracle.
For each player Pj ∈ P ∩ U2, the value skj is known so the partial decryption
m˜j = r
skj mod p can be computed and broadcast by A.
Note that if r = ga mod p, we can write
s = m
⎛
⎝∏
Pi∈P
pk
λPi0
i
⎞
⎠
a
= m
⎛
⎝ ∏
Pj∈P∩U2
gλ
P
j0skj
⎞
⎠
a⎛
⎝ ∏
Pk∈P∩U1
yλ
P
k0
βk
⎞
⎠
a
.
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Let us denote M = m
(∏
Pj∈P∩U2
gλ
P
j0skj
)a
, then we have s =
M
(∏
Pk∈P∩U1
yλ
P
k0
βk
)a
.
The goal of A is now to compute the values m˜i = r
ski = pkai mod p, for players
Pi ∈ P ∩ U1, where we have pki = y
βi .
First of all, A sends to his ElGamal decryption oracle the ciphertext
(r
P
Pk∈P∩U1
λP
k0
βk
, s). The plaintext that A obtains from his oracle is exactly M .
Then, for each player Pi ∈ P ∩U1, A sends to his ElGamal decryption oracle the
ciphertext (r
P
Pk∈P∩U1
λP
k0
βk −λ
P
i0βi
, s). The plaintext that A obtains from his oracle is
Myaβiλ
P
i0 . Since A already knows the value M , he can extract from this answer the
desired value yaβi = pkai = m˜i mod p. So A can perfectly simulate the answers to
the decryption queries that B makes.
Now B outputs (P∗, t∗,m0,m1), where P
∗ contains n∗ ≥ t∗ players and m0
and m1 are two messages with the same length. Since we assume that the attack
performed by B is meaningful, there must be at least one non-corrupted player in
P∗; that is, P∗ ∩ U1 = ∅. A chooses α0, α1 ∈ G at random and sends the messages
α0 ·m0 and α1 ·m1 to his ElGamal challenger, who sends back to A an encryption
(r, s) of message αb ·mb for a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} that A has to guess. Therefore,
we have (r, s) = (gw, αbmby
w) for some w ∈ Z∗q. At this point A makes a ﬁrst guess
by choosing at random b˜ ∈ {0, 1}, and compute the value z = s/α
b˜
m
b˜
. Note that if
b˜ = b, then we have that z = yw. Anyway, A sets r∗ = r and
s∗ = m
b˜
⎛
⎝ ∏
Pj∈P∗∩U2
(gw)λ
P
∗
j0 skj
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ ∏
Pi∈P∗∩U1
zλ
P
∗
i0 βi
⎞
⎠ .
Now A can choose a set P˜∗ ⊂ U1 ∪ U2 of n
∗ − t∗ dummy players P, such that
P˜∗ ∩ P∗ = ∅, and compute their partial decryption values m˜ = (r
∗)sk = pkw . For
these dummy players, we have
pk =
∏
Pi∈P
pk
λP
i
i =
⎛
⎝ ∏
Pi∈P∩U2
(gski)λ
P
i
⎞
⎠ ·
⎛
⎝ ∏
Pi∈P∩U1
(yβi)λ
P
i
⎞
⎠ .
Therefore, the desired partial decryptions are computed as
m˜ = r
P
Pi∈P∩U2
λP
i
ski · z
P
Pi∈P∩U1
λP
i
βi ,
which again are correct if b˜ = b.
Finally, A sends to B the resulting challenge ciphertext C∗ = (P∗, t∗, P˜ ∗, r∗, s∗,
{m˜k}Pk∈P˜∗). The attacker B eventually outputs a bit b
′. If b′ = b˜, then A outputs
this bit b′; otherwise, A outputs a random bit.
Let us compute the success probability of A. Note that if his ﬁrst guess b˜ is
correct, then the challenge ciphertext C∗ is consistent and by hypothesis B will
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guess the correct bit with probability 1/2 + ε. On the other hand, if b˜ = b, then
we have that z = yw αbmb
α
b˜
m
b˜
is a completely random value. Therefore, the information
that B receives in the challenge ciphertext C∗ is completely independent of the bit
b; for this reason, we can assume that B’s guess b′ is correct with probability 1/2.
In this case, A will see b′ = b˜ and will choose at random his own ﬁnal guess on b,
succeeding with probability 1/2. Summing up, we have
Pr[A wins his game] = Pr[b˜ = b ∧A wins his game]+Pr[b˜ = b ∧A wins his game] ≥
1
2
·
[(
1
2
+ ε
)
+
(
1
2
− ε
)
·
1
2
]
+
1
2
·
[
1
2
·
1
2
]
=
1
2
+
ε
4
.

5 Conclusion
Threshold broadcast encryption (TBE) schemes diﬀer from traditional threshold
public key encryption schemes [13,6] because the group of receivers and the threshold
for decryption are not decided from the beginning, but chosen (ad-hoc) by the entity
who encrypts each message. This diﬀerence makes TBE schemes more suitable for
some applications in real life, specially regarding mobile ad-hoc networks.
In this work we have designed a TBE scheme with shorter ciphertexts than
previous proposals, and whose security level is proved to be the same as in ElGamal
cryptosystem (at most CCA1 security). In a subsequent work [8], we have designed
a diﬀerent scheme which achieves maximum security (under CCA2 attacks) with
ciphertexts which have length n− t, as well. However, the scheme employs bilinear
pairings, which makes it less eﬃcient. An interesting open problem is to study if
the bound of n− t for the length of the ciphertexts can still be lowered.
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